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The enforcement of environmental law: civil or criminal
penalties?
Dr Michael Watson
Senior Lecturer in Law, School of Social Sciences, Bath Spa University College
Introduction
In the United Kingdom, regulatory bodies have traditionally
relied on the use of the criminal law to protect the
environment. Although the officials employed by these
agencies may have regarded it as the ‘last resort’,
prosecution – or at least the threat of prosecution – has
always been in the background. ‘Civil’ or ‘administrative’
sanctions have rarely been used. This situation may be
about to change.
In November 2004 the Department of the
Environment, Fisheries and Agriculture (Defra) organized a
conference on environmental justice. In a speech Elliot
Morley, the Environment Minister, said:
The [civil penalties] approach is more flexible and
designed to fit the penalty more to the crime. It frees
resources for criminal prosecutions while removing the
burden from respectable companies that make a low
level breach of regulations and raises the penalties for
people who carry out deliberate environmental crimes.1
Similar views were expressed by Harriet Harman, the
Solicitor General. An Environmental Justice Bill is currently
being drafted. This is likely to provide for the increased
use of non-criminal penalties. There is growing evidence
that civil sanctions are at last being given serious
consideration. What are the implications for the
environment?
Criminal law and the environment
In England and Wales, the Environment Agency is the main
regulatory body. Each year it records around 50,000
environmental incidents and prosecutes approximately
700 offenders. As most are charged with strict liability
offences which do not requireproof of fault, conviction is
the norm. Convictions generally lead to modest fines. In
2002, the average fine imposed by magistrates was £2730.
The average Crown Court fine was £4600. There were a
few custodial sentences (1.2 per cent of convictions).2
It seems clear that most environmental offenders –
the vast majority, in fact – are not prosecuted. When
prosecutions occur, the penalties are unlikely to deter
future offending. They usually bear little relation to either
the substantial profits that can be made by those who
choose to defy the law or to the environmental costs
associated with their activities. Fly-posting, commercial
fly-tipping, habitat destruction and animal trafficking are
obvious examples. Environmental crime often makes good
business sense.3
Animal trafficking provides a useful case study. The
global trade in animals, plants and their by-products seems
to be worth around $160 billion (approximately £85
billion) per annum. About a quarter of trade this appears
to be illegal, and has been analysed in major reports
commissioned by Traffic and the World Wide Fund for
Nature:
Although the scale of the illegal trade is difficult to
estimate, it is clear that the rewards it offers to
unscrupulous legitimate traders, businesses, organized
criminals and major organized crime groups are very
high indeed, and probably second only to the drugs
trade in terms of the potential levels of profit on offer
… The illegal trade exists because the market demand
exists, and there is clear evidence of the UK’s increasing
role as a key market.4
The ‘organized crime groups’ do not necessarily specialize
in animal trafficking. Most seem to be engaged in a range
of criminal activities. Similar networks can be used to transport
animals, drugs and firearms. Between 1998 and 2002, UK
courts imposed 15 fines on offenders convicted of wildlife
trade offences. The average fine was £963. Likely sentences:
are not really a deterrent to the dedicated criminal
prepared to undertake basic cost-benefit analysis …
The penalties available in the UK … signally fail to
deter wildlife offenders. They are regarded by many as
1 F Harvey ‘Environmental Criminals Face Tougher Fines’ Financial Times
29 November 2004; C Clover ‘Pledge to Decriminalise Environmental
Offences’ Daily Telegraph 29 November 2004.
2 C Dupont, P Zakkour ‘Trends in Environmental Sentencing in England
and Wales’ Environmental Resources Management (2003) 12.
3 HC Environmental Audit Committee Sixth Report ‘Environmental
Crime and the Courts’ (HC 126 Session 2003–2004); R Malcolm
‘Prosecuting for Environmental Crime: Does Crime Pay?’ ELM 14
[2002] 5 289–95; M Watson ‘Offences Against the Environment:
the Economics of Crime and Punishment’  ELM [2004] 16 4 200–04.
4 D Cook, M Roberts and J Lowther The International Wildlife Trade
and Organized Crime: A Review of the Evidence and the Role of the
UK (Regional Research Institute University of Wolverhampton 2002)
31–32. See also J Lowther, D Cook and M Roberts Crime and
Punishment in the Wildlife Trade (Regional Research Institute University
of Wolverhampton 2002); S Oldfield (ed) The Trade in Wildlife:
Regulation for Conservation (Earthscan London 2002).
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derisory and, in any event, the maximum sentence of
two years’ imprisonment has never been applied for a
single offence.5
In 1997, for example, the Metropolitan Police seized 138
fine shahtoosh shawls, worth £353,000, from a company
called the Renaissance Corporation. The source of the
rare wool is the Tibetan antelope – a critically endangered
species. As the animals are not domesticated, they must
be killed before they are fleeced. Approximately 1000
antelopes were killed to provide the wool for the shawls. The
company acknowledged its guilt and was fined.6
Not all environmental offenders seek financial gain.
Non-commercial fly-tipping occurs largely because
individuals wish to avoid the inconvenience of travelling
to licensed waste disposal sites. Young people may engage
in criminal damage and littering offences in order to gain
‘street-credibility’ with their peers.7 So-called ‘graffiti-
artists’ may have similar motives.8 But a rational system of
sentencing must take into account the environmental
damage done and the likelihood of prosecution.
In August 2004 a ‘graffiti-artist’ was convicted of 10
offences at Bath Youth Court after causing damage which
would cost an estimated £600,000 to remedy. The
unnamed 17-year-old (described in one report as ‘Britain’s
most prolific graffiti vandal’) asked for a further 98
offences to be taken into consideration. He was given a
12-month referral order and ordered to pay the local
authority £250 in compensation.9 It is often argued that
there should be more prosecutions for environmental
offences and that sentencing policy should be toughened.
The House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee,
for example, has proposed that sentencers should regard
damaging the environment as an aggravating factor. The
Committee also advocates the increased use of community
sentences for environmental offenders.10 At present, such
sentences are only available as an alternative to a
custodial sentence. They are not an alternative to a fine.
In practical terms, this means that community sentences
are not considered by judges and magistrates.
When individuals or companies intentionally or
recklessly damage the environment or endanger protected
species, prosecution is an appropriate strategy. Kathleen
Brickey has argued that the ‘decision to criminalize is
rooted in the core concepts of harm, culpability and
deterrence’.11 Most traditional crimes exist to deter conduct
which is both blameworthy and socially harmful. The
environmental offences mentioned above therefore have
much in common with more conventional crimes. Although
it is true that environmental offences often create potential
dangers rather than actual harm, the same can be said of
well-established inchoate crimes (incitement, conspiracy
and attempt) and more modern statutory offences (such
as dangerous driving).
It is entirely reasonable to prosecute so-called ‘graffiti-
artists’ (especially the more ‘mature’ ones) for criminal
damage. Property developers who deliberately destroy
habitats such as bat roosts in order to maximize their profits
deserve heavy fines.12 Commercial fly-tipping is a lucrative
business. It is also a business that is dominated by criminal
gangs. Successful operators use deception and intimidation
to make huge profits. They are real criminals who commit
real crimes.13 Such individuals are unlikely to be deterred
by non-custodial sentences.
Problems with prosecution
In his comparative study of environmental regulation in the
UK and the USA, William Wilson writes: ‘Apart from the
water pollution area, those looking for purpose or design in
the way that English law has come to use the criminal law to
enforce environmental statutes may look in vain. It has grown
up that way piecemeal, and out of habit as much by design.’14
The criminal law is used to punish those who deliberately
engage in large scale commercial fly-tipping and animal
trafficking operations. It is also used to punish those who
inadvertently breach licence conditions or accidentally
pollute watercourses. These ‘strict liability’ (or ‘regulatory’)
environmental offences are sometimes said to be ‘quasi-
criminal’. The leading case concerns the interpretation of
the Rivers (Prevention of Pollution) Act 1951; Alphacell
Ltd v Woodward [1972] 2 All ER 745. According
toViscount Dilhorne: ‘This Act is, in my opinion, one of
those Acts… which… deals with acts which are not criminal
in any real sense, but are acts which in the public interest
are prohibited under a penalty.’15
A distinction is often drawn between conduct which is
wrong in itself (mala in se) and conduct which society chooses
to prohibit (mala prohibita).16 The use of the criminal law in
such situations is often criticized. According to Wilson:
5 Cook (n 4) 29.
6 The fine was £1500. Lowther (n 4) 15, 35.
7 For an interesting account of littering offences see ‘Teenage Dirt
Bag Baby’ (Encams 2004)  http://www.encams.org/information/
publications/research/teenagedirtbag.pdf.
8 HC Environmental Audit Committee Ninth Report ‘Environmental
Crime Fly-tipping, Fly-posting, Litter, Graffiti and Noise’ (HC 445
Session 2003–2004).
9 R Savill ‘Graffiti Vandal’s £600,000 Damage’ Daily Telegraph 14
August 2004; Bath Chronicle 23 July 2004. See also M Watson
‘Graffiti: Popular Art, Anti-social Behaviour or Criminal Damage?’
(2004) 168 Justice of the Peace 668–70.
10 HC Sixth Report (n 3) paras 17 and 24.
11 ‘Environmental Crime at the Crossroads: the Intersection of
Environmental and Criminal Law Theory’ (1996) 71 Tulane Law
Review 487–528, at 504. For a different view see RJ Lazarus
‘Assimilating Environmental Protection into Legal Rules and the
Problem with Environmental Crime’ (1994) 27 Loyola of Los Angeles
Law Review 867–91.
12 HC Sixth Report (n 3) Ev 60. See also http://www.bats.org.uk/
BatCrimeReport.pdf.
13 B Webb and B Marshall A Problem-oriented Approach to Fly-tipping
(Jill Dando Institute of Crime Science University College London 2004)
http://www.jdi.ucl.ac.uk/downloads/pdf/JDIFlytippingreport.pdf;
J Vidal ‘Crime Gangs Fuel Explosion in Fly-tipping’ The Guardian 22
September 2004.
14 W Wilson Making Environmental Laws Work: an Anglo American
Comparison (Hart Publishing Oxford 1999) 110.
15 This statement is based on the words of Wright J in Sherras v De Rutzen
[1895] 1 QB 918 at 922. The case concerned a publican who inadvertently
supplied an alcoholic drink to a constable who was on duty.
16 ‘Since regulatory offences are directed primarily not to the conduct
itself but to the consequences of conduct, conviction of a regulatory
offence may be thought to import a significantly lower degree of
culpability than conviction of a true crime’; Tuckey LJ in Davies v
Health and Safety Executive [2002] EWCA Crim 2949.
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We may tend to weaken our criminal law by applying it
to too many situations where ordinary members of
the public would have difficulty recognising criminal
behaviour. It is not necessarily right that corporations
should face criminal sanctions the basis of which would
never be acceptable if applied to individuals.
In support of his argument he cites Nancy Firestone, a former
Deputy Assistant Attorney General at the United States
Department of Justice: ‘You want to make criminal offences
serious, or criminality becomes meaningless.’17 Michael Woods
and Richard Macrory have expressed concern about the:
‘wholesale’ use of strict liability in environmental criminal
law … This can lead to indignation on the part of
businesses which are found ‘guilty’ of offences without
having a real sense of moral fault, or an inclination to
treat such offences akin to a business overhead because
guilt is applied automatically.18
It is common for defendants to acknowledge their guilt and
concentrate on mitigating factors (such as their lack of fault).
This can lead to the trivialization of environmental offences.19
The problem is compounded by the fact that most judges
and magistrates see very few environmental cases. It has been
calculated that the average magistrate deals with one case
every seven years.20 Appropriate sentencing is difficult in
these circumstances.
There are other problems. An offence falls into the strict
liability category if no mens rea needs to be proved as to one
or more elements of the actus reus. It may be essential for the
prosecutor to establish mens rea in relation to other elements.
Strict liability offences are also subject to the criminal burden
of proof, that is proof beyond reasonable doubt. This has
major implications for the agencies responsible for
environmental protection.
Investigations have to be planned, and each element of
the criminal offences being investigated has to be capable
of strict proof. Investigators must have arrangements,
powers and procedures for carrying out any necessary
searches, for securing physical evidence, for managing
and documenting documentary and other evidence, for
conducting interviews under caution, sometimes on tape,
for taking witness statements, for reviewing their evidence
and ‘plugging gaps’, and for ensuring that all of this is
carried out in a timely fashion before the evidence goes
stale.21
The difficulties continue when a case goes to court. Stephen
Fineman has produced an interesting and authoritative study
of Environment Agency officers. The people he worked with
were:
visibly uncomfortable with enforcement and prosecution
– a power that was often more symbolic than real …
Gathering detailed legal evidence and appearing in court
were uncomfortable experiences for the inspector … Many
of them felt vulnerable, even de-skilled, in litigation
settings, despite the support of Agency specialists.
Ambiguity in interpreting licence conditions meant that
a magistrate or judge could rule against the Agency, or
impose just a modest penalty on the firm. ‘Failed
prosecutions really embarrass us’ was a common
sentiment.22
Agency staff sometimes face more than embarrassment. In
2002/2003 there were 144 recorded incidents of violent
and/or threatening behaviour (compared with 105 in 2001/
2002).23 It is hardly surprising that many prefer the threat of
prosecution to the reality. The EA inspectors observed by
Finemen ‘typically wanted to go through the motions of
getting tough, without going “the whole way”. For them, sabre-
rattling was part of the appropriate regulatory ritual, but actual
prosecution was not’.24
Civil and administrative sanctions
Many common law and civil law countries use non-criminal
sanctions to enforce environmental regulation.25 In the USA,
for example, these civil penalties are far more common than
criminal ones. In 1997, 97 per cent of the cases handled by
the Environmental and Natural Resources Division of the USA’s
Department of Justice were civil administrative ones. Only
three per cent were criminal cases. Attorneys employed by
state regulatory bodies also devote most of their time to
administrative enforcement.26
Although the terminology differs across jurisdictions, it
is useful to distinguish between civil fines and administrative
17 Wilson (n 14) 107, 110.
18 M Woods, R Macrory‘Environmental Civil Penalties: A More
Proportionate Response to Regulatory Breach‘(Centre for Law and
the Environment University College London 2003), 2.8. See also P
de Prez ‘Beyond Judicial Sanctions: the Negative Impact of Conviction
for Environmental Offences’ (2000) 2 Environmental Law Review
11–22. This is not a recent development. In the early 19th century
the strict liability offence of public nuisance was occasionally use to
protect the environment and punish those who endangered public
health; R Medley [1834] 2 C & P 292.
19 P de Prez ‘Excuses, Excuses: the Ritual Trivialization of Environmental
Offences’ (2000) 12(1) Journal of Environmental Law, 65–77. See
also H Croall ‘Sentencing the Business Offender’ (1991) 30(4) The
Howard Journal of Criminal Justice 280–97; J Arlen ‘The Potentially
Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability’ (1994) 23 Journal
of Legal Studies 333–67.
20 HC Sixth Report (n 3) Ev 5.
21 Wilson (n 14) 111.
22 Street-level Bureaucrats and the Social Construction of Environmental
Control’ (1998) 19(6) Organization Studies 953–74 at 959. See
also S Fineman ‘Enforcing the Environment: Regulatory Realities’
(2000) 9 Business Strategy and the Environment 62–72.
23 ‘Environmental Regulators Assaulted and Threatened at Home’
(2003) ENDS Report 338 10.
24 Fineman (n 22) at 67. This has apparently been the case for many
years. See K Hawkins ‘Bargain and Bluff: Compliance Strategy and
Deterrence in the Enforcement of Regulation’ (1983) 5(1) Law and
Policy Quarterly 35-73.
25 Wilson (n 14); Woods, Macrory (n 18) ch 4; N Franklin
‘Environmental Pollution Control: the Limits of the Criminal Law’
(1990) 2 Current Issues in Criminal Law 81–94; Z Lipman and L
Roots ‘Protecting the Environment through Criminal Sanctions:
The Environmental Offences and Penalties Act 1989 (NSW)’ (1995)
12 Env and Planning Law Journal 16–36.
26 Twenty-two out of twenty-three in the case of Texas in 1996;
Wilson (n 14) 107.
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penalties. Civil fines are essentially financial penalties which
lack the moral overtones of comparable criminal sentences.
Administrative penalties generally involve the suspension or
revocation of licences. Although civil fines can be very
substantial, the loss of a licence may be catastrophic for an
organization. The denial of permission to operate within the
law potentially incapacitates it. It is the corporate equivalent
of a custodial sentence (or possibly execution). In theory, the
aim is to protect the environment rather than to punish a
wrongdoer. In reality, the sanction (or the threat of its use) is
a major deterrent. It is, in fact, a much more potent economic
deterrent than a criminal conviction and a modest fine.27
Woods and Macrory believe that these penalties have
other significant advantages:
Civil penalties could … enhance the use of non-
criminal sanctions such as warning notices and
enforcement notices, by providing a more ‘hard-hitting’
but not overly harsh means of further recourse in the
event of continued non-compliance with a licence or
statutory prohibition … When prospective criminal
status is at issue, it seems obvious that any offender
will make greater efforts to avoid being found ‘guilty’,
even when there is acknowledgement that some degree
of administrative oversight or error has taken place. It
could also be  anticipated that potential offenders
would be less likely to risk non-compliance based on
the knowledge that the regulator would be better
equipped to take enforcement action without having
to resort to criminal proceedings.28
From an economic perspective, the imposition of criminal
sanctions is generally more expensive than the use of civil and
administrative ones.29 Many local authorities are reluctant
to prosecute environmental offenders. A recent survey of
73 authorities revealed that 51 had not prosecuted any fly-
tippers between 1998 and 2003. Financial considerations
seem to be an important factor.30
Civil and administrative sanctions are rarely used to
protect Britain’s environment. Local authorities are able to
impose fixed penalties for certain minor offences such as noise
pollution.31 Licences are rarely suspended or revoked. The
Environment Agency was established in 1996. By February
2002 it had revoked six waste management licences.32 Many
Agency inspectors have worked for the industries they now
regulate. They understandably have little desire to drive
companies out of business. They are also aware that the use
of such draconian measures generally leads to complex and
time-consuming civil appeals.33 Although they are reluctant
to prosecute they are even more reluctant to revoke licences
to operate.
Conclusion
The limitations of civil and administrative penalties must be
acknowledged. They can complement – but not replace –
more traditional criminal sentences. Civil and administrative
penalties enable regulators to impose financial costs on
individuals and companies that inadvertently or negligently
fail to comply with the law. These costs may be linked to the
wealth/annual turnover of offenders, their degree of fault, or
the extent of the environmental damage resulting from the
offender’s act or omission.34 In the USA and elsewhere, the
use of such penalties ensures that only the most culpable
offenders are prosecuted.35 When convicted, they generally
receive very tough sentences.36
If oil leaks from a pipeline owned by a multinational
corporation, a civil penalty based on a tariff linked to turnover
is (in the absence of fault) likely to be more appropriate (and
effective in causing preventative measures) than a criminal
conviction and a modest fine. Such penalties are unlikely to
be effective against those who intentionally or recklessly
damage the environment for financial or personal reasons. A
legitimate waste disposal company will seek to retain its
operating licences. A business that operates outside the law
may have no licences to lose.
Environmental offences are often committed by people
who have limited financial resources. A fly-posting campaign
may be informally commissioned by a major commercial
company, but the fly-posting itself will normally be sub-
contracted to individuals who are typically incapable of paying
significant fines (civil or criminal). Community sentences and
ant-social behaviour orders are likely to have greater deterrent
value.
The ‘expressive’ functions of the criminal law must also
be recognized.37 Conviction of an offence – becoming a
‘convict’ – involves moral condemnation. Civil penalties – no
matter how severe – may be seen as a form of taxation. A
property developer may (as a rational economic actor) agree
to preserve an important habitat in order to avoid a civil
financial penalty. The developer may wish to avoid a criminal
conviction for more fundamental reasons.
Proposals to increase the use of civil and administrative
sanctions in the United Kingdom are to be welcomed.
Environmental regulators in other countries have used these
penalties for decades. Their value cannot be denied. But they
must not be allowed to obscure the criminal behaviour that
often lies behind offences against the environment.
27 A Ogus and C Abbot ‘Sanctions for Pollution: Do We Have the Right
Regime?’ (2002) 14(3) Journal of Environmental Law 283–98.
28 Woods, Macrory (n 18) paras 7.9 and 7.10.
29 MA Cohen ‘Criminal Law as an Instrument of Environmental Policy:
Theory and Empirics’ in A Heyes (ed) The Law and Economics of the
Environment (Edward Elgar Cheltenham 2001) 198–216 at 200.
30 Dupont, Zakkour (n 2) 41.
31 Sections 8 and 9 Noise Act 1996. The fixed penalty is currently £100.
32 Ogus and Abbot (n 27) at 288. There are hundreds of prosecutions
for waste offences each year.
33 Fineman (n 22) and Malcolm (n 3) at 295.
34 The calculation of optimal fines for environmental offences is difficult
and controversial. It is much easier to apply optimum deterrence
theory to companies than to individuals. Compare Cohen (n 29)
with S Shavell ‘Criminal Law and the Optimal Use of Non-monetary
Sanctions as a Deterrent’ (1985) Columbia Law Review 1232–262.
35 KF Brickey ‘Charging Practices in Hazardous Waste Prosecutions’
(2001) 62(3) Ohio State Law Journal 1077–144.
36 Wilson (n 14) 107.
37 S Hedman ‘Expressive Functions of Criminal Sanctions in Environmental
